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Abstract
Self-instigated isolation is heavily relied on to curb severe acute respiratory syndrome corona-
virus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) transmission. Accounting for uncertainty in the latent and prepatent
periods, as well as the proportion of infections that remain asymptomatic, the limits of this
intervention at different phases of infection resurgence are estimated. We show that by
October 2020, SARS-CoV-2 transmission rates in England had already begun exceeding levels
that could be interrupted using this intervention alone, lending support to the second national
lockdown on 5th November 2020.
A general population lockdown occurred in England on 23rd March 2020 to reduce severe
acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) transmission. This drastic interven-
tion successfully inhibited disease spread by rapidly depleting the opportunities for transmis-
sion events between infected and susceptible people remaining in general circulation [1].
Subsequent to easing out of lockdown from 4th July 2020, infections resurged and England
entered its second national lockdown on 5th November 2020. The return of millions of
(largely susceptible) people to general circulation underlies the epidemic re-entering an expo-
nential growth phase. However, also culpable in the current public health emergency is the
failure of interventions during the period following lockdown’s release.
Contact tracing endeavours in 2020 to reduce SARS-CoV-2 transmission have been inef-
fective in England and so isolation has been primarily instigated by those responding to symp-
toms’ development in themselves or their close associations [2]. The mechanism by which this
reactive isolation operates is importantly distinct from pre-emptive mass quarantine (lock-
down). Symptoms-prompted, reactive isolation only applies to individuals who are infected
(cf. the total population), and, more specifically, to those who register symptoms. Hence, infec-
tious individuals who have not yet experienced symptoms, or who will never experience them,
are missed.
The mathematical epidemiology of reactive isolation is fairly nascent yet critical in the con-
text of the current epidemic. Here, we generate estimates for reactive isolation thresholds that
account for uncertainties in the latent and pre-patent period of infection as well as in the pro-
portion of infected individuals that register and respond appropriately to symptoms.
Mathematical derivation of reactive self-isolation
Beginning with the simplest derivation for physical isolation: the pre-emptive quarantine
threshold proportion (Q) is Q > (1− (1/R)) where ‘R’ is the reproduction number [3]. For
reactive isolation (Q*), this threshold is inflated to account for the leaked infections occurring
because of the delay between becoming infectious and first exhibiting symptoms: Q* > (1−
(1/R)) × [1/(1 − (( p− l )/g))]. Respectively, p and l are the prepatent and latent periods of
infection (in days), and g is the time until recovery (12 days on average [4]). If symptoms
typically develop at the same time as an individual becomes infectious, the square-bracket
component equals one and the original threshold (Q) is regained. A further modification
can be made to account for the proportion of infections that never give rise to symptoms
(denoted ‘a’): Q** > (1/(1− a)) × (1− (1/R)) × [1/(1 − (( p− l )/g))]. For example, if half of
infections remained asymptomatic, the proportion of symptomatic infections that need to
be isolated to achieve an equivalent impact must be doubled. As with those who never develop
symptoms, individuals who fail to respond appropriately to developing symptoms – early indi-
cation is that this is not a negligible proportion [5] – will continue to contribute to transmis-
sion, so ‘a’ could be considered a composite of these two proportions.
Accounting for uncertainty in parametrisation
The latent and prepatent periods are quite variable for coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19)
patients. Instead of single-point estimates for these parameters, collated data form a distribu-
tion of reported times. The latent period is drawn at random from a Weibull distribution and
then subtracted from the random draw from a second Weibull
distribution depicting the range of reported prepatent periods.
Figure 1a illustrates these distributions as informed by the clinical
and epidemiological literature [6–8]. Also shown is the distribu-
tion of times between development of infectiousness and symp-
toms onset as fitted to 10 000 random draws. The distributions
of prepatent and latent periods overlap so to avoid the possibility
of symptoms developing prior to infectiousness, random draws
whereby infectiousness trailed the day of symptoms onset were
removed and resampled. In total, 10 000 random draws were
then made from this newly derived distribution of the delay
between infectiousness and symptoms, and the isolation threshold
(Q**) was estimated for a range of R values and a range of asymp-
tomatic proportions (Python code for this analysis is freely avail-
able at https://github.com/lwyakob/COVIDquarantine).
Isolation thresholds accounting for uncertainty
Figure 1b shows the mean isolation threshold required to control
SARS-CoV-2 accounting for the range of estimates for the prepa-
tent and latent periods. The value for R is dynamic, varying accord-
ing to current intervention effectiveness and population-level
susceptibility, so the isolation threshold is shown for a range of
plausible R values. The form of the relationship between Q* and
R shows an isolation threshold that increases asymptotically with
reproduction number. However, allowing for uncertainty in prepa-
tent and latent periods results in a wide 95% prediction interval.
The interpretation is that when accounting for both the uncertainty
in estimating the population mean, plus the random variation of
the individual values, reactive isolation cannot interrupt transmis-
sion (at least 95 times out of 100) if R already exceeds a value of
∼1.7 (blue cross in Fig. 1b marks the R value whereby the isolation
threshold proportion exceeds unity).
Reactive isolation is further limited when asymptomatic infec-
tions comprise a non-negligible proportion (alternatively, when
those exhibiting symptoms fail to isolate themselves to some
degree). Figure 1c shows the theoretical limits of the proportion
of infections that can be asymptomatic and yet SARS-CoV-2
transmission interrupted through isolating symptomatic indivi-
duals (using the Q** expression). Superimposed on this trade-off
between the reproduction number and the isolation threshold are
estimates for R in England as of October 2020 [10], and the 95%
confidence and predictive intervals for the proportion of infec-
tions that remain asymptomatic as generated by a living system-
atic review [9]. Respectively, by October, 75% and 85% of these
parameter spaces were already beyond the level at which reactive
isolation can be sufficient to interrupt transmission (i.e. these
regions fall to the right of the hatched arc in Fig. 1c meaning
the isolation threshold proportion exceeds unity).
Limitations and future research
One limitation of the current analysis is the consideration of
transmission and control at the population level rather than strati-
fied by various risk factors. To address this, results were generated
for a full range of R values. It is important to note that
Fig. 1. (a) Dashed lines indicate distributions for the latent (blue, Weibull(α = 4, β = 2)) and prepatent period (red, Weibull(α = 6, β = 3)) as derived from the COVID-19
literature [6–8]. The solid line is the resulting distribution for the time difference between the two from which 10 000 random draws were made (inset). (b) The
isolation threshold (Q*) as calculated for the 10 000 random draws along with the mean (white line) and 95% predictive interval (dashed lines). The blue cross
indicates the theoretical maximum R number for which reactive isolation may interrupt transmission. (c) The maximum asymptomatic proportion of COVID-19
infections that permits transmission interruption by reactive isolation for a range of R values (the hatched curve is calculated using the expression for Q**).
The red boxes illustrate estimates for the asymptomatic proportion and the R for England as of October 2020 [9, 10].
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stratification would impact the derivation of R but not the
population-level isolation thresholds calculated for a given R
value [11]. Another limitation is the implicit assumption that,
in the absence of intervention, asymptomatically infected indivi-
duals contribute to onwards transmission as much as symptomat-
ically infected individuals. It is unclear how questionable this
assumption is but clinical studies indicate that asymptomatic
and symptomatic individuals have similar viral loads [12].
Should evidence arise of their differential contributions to trans-
mission, the model and code associated with this study can be
modified easily to account for this feature.
Even during pre-emptive quarantine (i.e. lockdown) the for-
mulae described here continue to apply to those who remain in
general circulation (e.g. essential personnel). Future research
should look at how isolation thresholds can be estimated to
inform this intervention combination, among others.
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